Sunday, April 4, 2010

IS RAILWAYS’ TURNROUND SUSTANABLE? by U.S.Jha IRTS. M.Phil. PGPPM


IS RAILWAYS’ TURNROUND SUSTANABLE?
In February 2009 when the Railways’ Minister presented Budget Railways were poised to create history by generating a cash surplus of Rs. 90,000 crores in last five years as against acute cash shortage in the previous few years before this period. This was the same Railway that defaulted on payment of Dividend of Rs.2800 crores and whose fund balances dipped to Rs 359 cr. in 2001. Rakesh Mohan Committee, in July 2001 has termed it terminally ill organization, which was on the verge of bankruptcy. At that time it was believed that very soon Railways would get involved in a terminal debt trap with an additional financial liability of over Rs. 61,000 crores. The operating ratio had reached low levels of performance- 98.3%-in 2000-01. The fund balance had reached a low of just Rs.149 crores in 1990-2000. In contrast to this by the year 2007-08 Indian Railway achieved the Operating Ratio of 76% - best ever for IR and one of the best in world. Railways are now having substantial amount of surplus money and it is the second largest profit making Public Sector Undertaking after ONGC. Thus the railways have been able to make total turnaround of its performance.
However, the biggest doubt prevailing in the minds of many critics is that whether this turnaround of Railways is going to last for longer and whether this turn round is sustainable? Thus the purpose of this article is to analyze these issues. To search the answer of these questions we would try to examine what were the specific actions taken to improve the working of the Railways and whether these actions are going to give continuously better result or do we need to take some more or different approach to make the Railways turnaround really sustainable.
Let us see what the steps were proposed to be taken to improve the productivity: -
Quantum jump in Freight Business
The Railways have been able to maintain outstanding freight performance for the fifth consecutive year and incremental loading is likely to be more about 14 per cent MT. Thus the incremental loading of about 170 MT achieved in the three years. This would exceed the total incremental loading of the 1990’s by 125 per cent. To maintain this rate of growth, the IR has taken several steps to improve the availability of trains. The IR has adapted its policies to the needs of the market and customers.
Cement and Steel - Mission 200 Million Tonnes
Since introduction of the New Economic Policy in the year 1991, Railways have been constantly losing share in cement and steel traffic. As a result Railways’ share in transportation of these commodities has declined from two thirds in 1991 to one third. During2006-07 Railways have increased their share in transportation of cement and steel by seven percent. While the cement and steel industry registered a growth rate of ten percent this year, IR’s cement and steel traffic have increased by twenty to thirty percent. This is the result of market and customer oriented policies. Now the Railways have focused on Mission 200 Million Tonnes. Railways are hopeful that by the year 2011-12, Railways traffic from cement and steel industry will increase to 200 MT each.
Container Traffic - Mission 100 Million Tonnes
To increase the container traffic 15 licenses have been issued for the running of container trains in the last two years. Efforts are being made to increase container traffic to 100 million tones by 2011-12, from the present 20 million tonnes. Over the next five years, it is expected that investment worth several thousand crores of rupees will flow in for the development of container wagons, terminals and other related rail infrastructure.
Triple Stack Container Train
After successful experimentation of running double stack container trains on diesel route, double stack container trains are now running between Pipavav and Jaipur. The efforts are on to run triple stack container trains with low height container on diesel routes and double stack container trains on electrified routes on pilot basis. Such containers would be useful for loading of motor vehicles. Once it becomes successful it can be implemented in other regions.
Long Term Service Level Agreements
Railways have signed a 30 yearlong term Service Level Agreement (SLA) for transportation of coal. Similar SLAs are required to be signed with several new cement, steel and mega power plants, which are being set up in the country. Railways should provide necessary support services for laying new lines up to their facilities, enhancing capacity of existing lines, making available wagons designed to suit their specific requirements, formulation of pricing policy and in developing loading and unloading terminals.
Merry Go Round (MGR) System For Coal
Several companies, including NTPC, are operating their own MGR Systems. New power plants are also planning setting up of MGR systems. Railways have domain expertise in running these systems more efficiently and economically at costs that are lower than their existing costs. Therefore, more and more companies should be encouraged to enter into SLAs with the Railways for the running of MGR.
Development of Freight Terminals
There has been a significant increase in Railways traffic with the commissioning of the warehouse complex in the Bangalore Goods shed. After this experience Railways have decided to develop all basic facilities at freight terminals handling more than 15 rakes per month, over the next three years. A new Plan sub head has been opened for expenditure on development and up gradation of freight terminals to ensure adequate provision of funds for these works.
Improvement of NTKM to GTKM Ratio
For a payload of one tonne, Railways carry a tare weight of a little less than a tonne. The Railways have realized that an improvement of one percent in this ratio would yield an additional earning per annum of Rs 1500 cr. Consequently it has been realized that a multi pronged strategy of increasing the payload and reducing the tare weight of trains, running trains loaded in both directions and minimizing empty running of trains for maintenance and examination and other such measures would have to be simultaneously adopted over the next few years to effect a 5 per cent improvement in this ratio. Since average speed of vacuum goods train is much slower than air brake stocks it has been decided that all types of vacuum brake rolling stock will be eliminated in two stages so that we get freer path to run higher speed train. As per the utilization pattern it has been decided to reorganize wagon examination and maintenance centers will be reorganized to minimize empty running of trains. Several trains have wagons that run empty in both the directions. After implementation of FOIS, the numbers and location of such wagons will be monitored to detach them for repair at the nearest depot.
Higher Axle Load Goods Trains
The Railways are already running CC+8+2 tonnes, which have helped Railways to achieve 714 million tonnes loading in 2006-07. The pilot project of introducing of 22.3 and 22.9 Tonne axle load trains has yielded good results. Recently, 25 T Axle load trains have also been run on pilot basis. Railways have extended running of 22.9 tonne axle load trains on several routes and 25 tonne axle load trains on select other routes.
Wagons with better payload to tare weight ratio
Wagons are the bread winning horses of the Railways. An increase of 10% in wagon productivity would lead to annual incremental earnings of Rs.4000 crore for the Railways. Railways have earned several thousand crores by improving the wagon turnaround time and enhancing per wagon payload. Acting further on this line RDSO has designed new covered and open wagons with a pay load to tare weight ratio of 3 and above, fit for 22.9 T axle load. The carrying capacity of freight trains comprising of such open and covered wagons will improve by 10 and 30% respectively, compared with existing trains. Railways have therefore decided to stop procurement of open and covered wagons of old design from 2007-08. Production of 25 T axle load wagons and 22.9 T axle load wagons of new design will commence in 2007-08. Similarly, 22.9 T and 25 T Axle load wagons suitable for steel and petroleum products will also be manufactured.
Manufacture of new design wagons by Wagon Manufacturers
Till now Railways have been procuring wagons based on RDSO’s designs. Now it has been decided to bring about a total change in this system. Now, wagon manufacturers will be permitted to supply wagons of their own designs, with RDSO recommended bogies, coupler, and draft and brake gear. RDSO will certify and approve the new designs of wagons from the safety angle within 9 months. However these higher payload lower tare weight wagons with new technology would be costlier compared to old wagons. To encourage the development of such new technology wagons, a suitable freight discounts policy is being evolved so that the Railways and investors share benefits of the new technology.
Arrangement of rolling stock maintenance
The Railways have improved loading with available resources through better utilization of existing rolling stock. Through rationalization of driver and loco links Indian Railway have been able to spare more than 250 engines for running other trains. Now world-class facilities are being provided at all train examination points where more than 5 goods trains are examined per day. Most air brake trains under the system of premium CC or premium end-to-end has been covered examination. Railways have decided to make unit exchange spares based maintenance arrangements for all types of rolling stock. This would bring about significant improvement in the productivity of rolling stock.
Throughput enhancement works
To meet the growing competition against the road and to meet the challenges of Railways’ own bottleneck it is imperative that speedy expansion of capacity on the 20,000 kms. long high-density network is finished earliest. The railways have decided that an integrated approach of route-wise planning and implementation would be undertaken to obtain full benefits from investment on these routes. This network would be made capable for running 23T axle load trains and mineral routes would be upgraded for running of 25T axle load trains. Need based enhancement in line capacity of such routes would be undertaken by constructing second, third or fourth lines. Installing IBS would reduce distance between two sections and automatic signaling would be provided at both ends of busy junction stations to enhance line capacity. For seamless and faster rail movement, flyovers and bypasses etc. will be constructed at busy junction stations and yard designs will be modified to avoid cross movement of the trains. High-speed turnouts with a speed of 30 km per hour would be laid on such routes. Additional diesel and electric locomotives and wagons would be produced. Adequate funds provision would be made for throughput enhancement works.
Market Surveys
Railways earn ninety per cent of its freight business from transportation of a few select commodities. With a view to broad base business and improve stability in the growth rate Railways. It is imperative to diversify and increase the mix of carried commodities. Every zonal railway should engage an independent market survey agency to identify new traffic streams.
Passenger Business

By playing the volume game by inducting additional coaches in popular trains, Railways have facilitated travel of more people and increased the earnings. Railways’ policy of licensing of parcel and catering services through open tender has also borne good results. It is for these reasons that despite reduction in fares, the losses in coaching business are likely to decrease by several hundred crores.
Increase in capacity of passenger coaches
Railways have designed coaches with new layouts, having significantly higher capacity than the previous coaches. The capacity of sleeper coaches has been increased from 72 to 84, AC Chair Car from 67 to 102, AC 3 Tier from 64 to 81, AC 2 Tier from 46 to 48 and AC 1st from 18 to 22. There has been some opposition for providing three seats in the side in sleeper or 3rd AC coaches. Hence the IR has decided to discontinue such coaches. Thus, despite in capacity these all coaches would be convenient and comfortable for the passengers.
Rakes with standard composition
Due to absence of standard composition for passenger trains, several trains reach the destination in the morning and remain standing till night. To ensure better utilization of the rake links, Railways have decided to increase the number of passenger trains having standard rake composition. Through revision in maintenance practices, Break Power Certificate (BPC) of passenger trains was given for 3500 kms. in place of 2500 kms. These two decisions will result in considerable increase in availability of coaches.
Railways’ New Profile - 11th Five-year plan

The Railways are targeting a freight loading of 1100 million tonnes and passenger traffic of 840 cr. by the terminal year of the 11th Five-year plan. In order to make this unprecedented growth a reality, it is absolutely essential that in the next few years the Railways’ transport capacity be expanded and doubled, unit cost be brought down by playing the volume game and customers be provided world-class services.
The quantum jump in Investment
During the 11th Five Year Plan, Railways are required to invest many times more as compared to earlier plans. There is no readymade investment policy for a vast network like the Indian Railways. The growing demand for transportation can only be met through a harmonious blend of short term and long-term policies. Railways short-term policy of investing in low cost high return projects has been successful in eliminating network bottlenecks and in ensuring effective utilization of rolling stock. Alongside a twin mid-term and long-term investment strategy is required to be adopted to enhance productivity through, modernization and technological up gradation on the one hand and enhancement of capacity of the network and rolling stock on the other.
Even though the Golden Quadrilateral and its diagonals constitute 16% of the rail network, more than 75% of the traffic moves on these routes. As these routes are super-saturated, IR has make up mind for construction of East-West, East-South, North-South and South-South corridors. Here dream is to construct these corridors in a manner that they develop into efficient and economical trunk routes for speedier, longer, heavy-haul trains. After completion of the freight corridors, it is expected that the problem of passenger and goods trains running on the same network at different speeds will be solved. The IR has been able to achieve such progress in the construction of East-West (in two part- West to north between Mumbai and Delhi and North East between Amritsar and Howrah) by Japanese funding. However, the speed of work is rather show. The IR needs to ensure its timely implementation for getting better result.
Construction of High Speed Passenger Corridor

The rapid growth of the economy, rising industrialization and urbanization and unprecedented growth in intercity travel, has opened infinite possibilities for developing high-speed passenger corridors. Railways have decided to conduct pre-feasibility studies for construction of high speed passenger corridors, equipped with state of the art signaling and train control systems, for running high speed trains at speeds of 300 to 350 kms per hour; one each in the Northern, Western, Southern and Eastern regions of the country. These trains would cover distances of up to 600 kms in two to three hours. All alternatives including Private Public Partnership will be considered for implementation of these corridors. Global warming and changing climatic conditions are a worldwide concern today. These energy efficient and environment friendly systems would go a long way in alleviating these concerns.

Rolling Stock Modernization and Capacity Augmentation

In view of the demands of growing traffic, along with expansion of network, availability of rolling stock will be increased through effective utilization of available rolling stock, technical up gradation and modernization and by setting up new production units. During the 11th Five Year Plan production of rolling stock will be doubled as compared with the previous Plan. The Railways have planned that capacity of existing rail coach and loco production units will be enhanced through expansion of these units. High horse power, energy efficient locomotives with new technology would also be produced. During this plan, production of MEMU, DEMU and EMU coaches would also be stepped up. One new factory each for rail coaches, diesel locomotives, electric locomotives and wheels would also be established. The locomotives to be manufactured in these units would be equipped with state of the art technology and would be capable of hauling longer, heavier high axle load trains. The new Rail Coach Factory would produce high capacity, modern and comfortable coaches. Similarly production of 32 tonne axle load, higher payload lower tare weight and track friendly wagons will start for the new Dedicated Freight Corridors.

Use of IT in the Railway services

It has been planned that in the XI five year plan, investment in IT projects would be increased to several thousand crore rupees to harness the immense possibilities offered by IT in the interest of Indian Railways. IT applications would be deployed to increase passenger and freight earnings, improve the image of the Railways in the eyes of the customer, reduce operating costs, ensure effective utilization of human and physical resources and to help the top management in arriving at long-term policy decisions by developing MIS & LRDSS. A commercial portal will be developed in the next 3 years for yield management, especially to attract traffic for returning empties and filling up vacant seats. All modules of Freight Online Information System (FOIS) including rolling stock maintenance and examination, revenue apportionment, crew management, control charting Coaching Online Information System (COIS) etc. will be integrated and implemented in a time bound manner for completion by 2010. Alongside ERP packages will be implemented in workshops, production units and selected zonal railways. A common website integrating the more than 50 different web sites of Railways will be developed with built in facilities like e-payment and e-tendering. For an integrated approach in IT, CRIS will be entrusted with coordination of all IT applications of the Railways and for development of a comprehensive vision on IT. CRIS will be developed as an autonomous and empowered organization, drawing officers from various Railways services. Indian IT companies have hoisted the national flag all over the world.



Railway Electrification
The Railways have planned that electrified network will be extended over the Golden Quadrilateral and its diagonals, and in all directions from Kashmir to Kanniya Kumari and Guwahati to Amritsar by the end of the 11th Five Year Plan. Electrification of Thiruvananthapuram-Kanniya Kumari, Thrichur-Guruvayur, Tiruchirapalli-Madurai, Barabanki-Gorakhpur-Barauni-Katihar-Guwahati and Jallandhar to Baramullah sections will be completed during the 11th Five Year Plan. In the first phase, electrification of Jalandhar -Jammu, Barabanki-Gorakhpur-Barauni and Tiruchirapalli-Madurai sections are proposed to be taken up in 2007-08. Similarly, doubling and electrification of Pune-Wadi-Guntkal and electrification of Daitari-Banspani, Haridaspur-Paradeep new lines will be undertaken by Indian Railways’ Public Enterprise RVNL in the coming years.
Public Private Partnership Schemes
Investments at a much larger scale would to be required in eleventh five year plan for different capacity and expansion network as compared with the provision made in the Tenth Five Year Plan. The funding of plan of several lakh crores would require multi-source approach based upon deployment of internal resources, market borrowing, and public private partnership and budgetary support. The improved financial performance of the Railways will enable a large share of the financing to be met from internal and external budgetary resources. The Railways have to seek partnership with the private sector on the terms that are in the interest of Railways and their customers. For example, by leasing out catering and parcel services the Railways have reduced catering and parcel losses of more than a thousand crores. The Railways have enhanced their capacity by attracting private investments in the wagon investment schemes and siding liberalization schemes etc. Even while retaining the core activity of train operations, Railways have awarded licenses to private parties for running container trains, which is likely to attract investment of thousands of crores in wagons and construction of terminals over the next few years. Public Private Partnership (PPP) options are being explored with the aim of modernization of metro and mini-metro stations with world-class passenger amenities, development of agro retail outlets and supply chains, construction of multi-modal logistic parks, warehouses and budget hotels and expansion of network and increase in production capacity. The Railways have constituted a PPP Cell which would develop the policy framework to provide non-discriminatory level playing field to investors, prepare the bankable documents and set up the procedure for awarding partnerships through open tendering system.
Thus these steps would help the Railways to meet the challenges being faced by the Railways. When we evaluate the recent past experience of the Railways we found that whole host of schemes have been put in place to attract the freight customer. These include mini rakes for the small customer, volume discounts for the large customer, lean season discount scheme, long term freight incentive scheme, loyalty discount scheme, discounts for providing traffic in the empty direction, incentives at terminals like engine on load and construction of sidings, wagon investment scheme etc.
There was substantial growth of 11.7 percent in earning in 2008-09 over 2007-08. Similar a historic increase of 17 per cent was registered in freight earnings in 2006-07 .A comparison of the loading figures between 2005-06 and 2004-05 shows that increased loadings have been achieved in coal, other goods, raw material for steel plants, and iron ore for exports. The percentage increase with respect to 2004-05 was most significant for other goods (25%) followed by raw material for steel plants (19%), cement (14%), and iron ore for exports (13%). The increase in coal was 8%. The increased axle load has facilitated 14% improvement. Due to increased rake availability as a consequence of (i) improvements in wagon turnaround, especially in iron ore circuits due to the efforts towards 24 hour loading in sidings in SER and SWR, and reduced train examination and (ii) use of covered wagon rakes which would otherwise have gone empty in SWR has also contributed in improved loading.
Most spectacular growth has been in Passenger earnings. There has been increased of 7 percent in 2008-09 over 2007-08. Similarly the passenger earnings in 2005-06 had gone up only by 7.2% over 2004-05.The main reason for the growth of passenger earning were due to initiatives in running 24 coach trains, deploying additional coaches in well patronized trains and even running of additional trains and up gradation of passengers if the seats are running empty. Thus a range of initiatives focused on (i) reducing passenger losses by increasing volumes by increasing the length and occupancy of trains (ii) modifying train length and composition based on passenger profile management (analysis of the passenger reservation system data to understand class wise and season wise occupancy of trains) (iii) increasing average speeds of trains (iv) providing affordable air-conditioned travel for the poor and (v) improved design of coaches. Running of ‘Garib – Rath’ has been one of the successful experiments which has been immensely found to be popular amongst passenger.
There has been substantial growth in other coaching earnings in last four years. These earning came through parcel, catering, advertising, and dividends from the public sector units under the ministry. The increase of 24.2% in 2005-06 over 2004-05 followed a similar growth of 24.7% in 2004-05 over 2003-04. In the earlier years, the growth in this segment had been marginal. This source of revenue had not received as much focus as in the past four years. However, a slew of initiatives on these areas had been implemented over the past some years, making it attractive for private parties to take advantage of the market opportunity that IR could offer.
International Comparison
Russia
According to Russell Pittman1 the Russian railways system is in the midst of a complete restructuring. As part of a ten-year, three-stage reform plan, the railway operating company, RZhD, has only recently been completely separated from the Ministry of Railway Transport. A small number of new train operating companies has been granted access to the infrastructure, carrying only oil and oil products at this point but with the potential to carry other commodities as well. The stated long-term goal of the plan is for RZhD to control 50 per cent of the wagon fleet and to continue to run trains in competition with private train operating companies, which would be guaranteed non-discriminatory terms of access to the track and other infrastructure. Thus – although the exact nature of the post-reform industry structure remains not completely clear – the idea is evidently to allow access by non-integrated train operators but not to force complete vertical separation, and to enforce non-discriminatory terms of access in order to create and protect competition between integrated and nonintegrated train operators
Those arguing for restructuring and reform of the rail sector, particularly in transition and developing economies, have tended to focus on three (interrelated) goals: reducing the demands of the railway sector for government funding, increasing the efficiency of operation of the railway sector, and creating competitive options for shippers. The first goal is not consistent with the policy option of marginal cost access pricing and government funding to make up the fixed costs. The second goal is not consistent either with this option, for reasons of incentives for operational efficiency, or with the option of fully allocated cost access pricing, for reasons of pricing efficiency. Both seem consistent with access pricing schemes utilizing second or third degree price discrimination, but these in turn seem as a practical matter to run counter to the goal of creating competition conditions in transport markets.
Pittman argues that the way out of this dilemma may in many cases lie in abandoning the premise that railways restructuring should be based on the concepts of vertical access and vertical separation. Many freight shippers can take advantage of intermodal competition, using the options of road and/or water haulage to keep a ceiling on rail rates, and this will be increasingly the case for manufactured goods in Russia, especially European Russia. Unfortunately intermodal competition is typically not an option for shippers of the bulk commodities – oil, coal, minerals, chemicals, timber – that make up the largest share of Russian rail haulage.
Britain
The railway network in Britain was planned, financed and built by the private sector in the 19th Century. The industry was nationalized in 1948, and then returned to private ownership during the period 1995-1997, as part of the wider programme of sell-offs carried out by four successive Conservative administrations (1979-1997).
Since nationalization, rail traffic has been in almost continual decline in the face of increased competition from road transport. In the early 1950s, passenger rail travel accounted for roughly 17% of total passenger traffic - by the mid-1990s this share had fallen to around 5%. Rail freight business saw an even sharper loss of market share, from over 40% to just 7% over the same period, driven by the loss of traffic to roads, and the decline of Britain’s heavy manufacturing and primary industries (which rail freight was particularly well placed to serve). Rail volumes also fell in absolute terms up until the mid 1990s. These trends have been reversed since privatization.
Basically the British Railways moved into a loss-making position in the mid-1950s and, in spite of the line and station closures implemented following the Beeching reports (1963; 1965) - which saw the total route mileage reduced by a third - the industry’s financial position continued to deteriorate during the 1970s and early 1980s (as productivity growth slowed whilst wages were on the increase; and as government controls prevented the development of commercial pricing). The 1968 Transport Act explicitly recognized the need for government subsidy to support loss-making (but socially-beneficial) services. However, in line with worsening performance, the level of subsidy also increased over time, reaching £1.6bn by 1985/86, compared to £600m in 1968 (1999/00 prices).
During the 1980s it was recognized that the financial position of the industry, and the requirement for government support, would complicate any attempt at privatizing the industry. Rail privatization would require route closures and/or continued government subsidy after sale. As a result, proposals for rail privatization developed slowly during the 1980s, finally culminating in the sale of the industry during the period 1995-1997. However, the government (and BR), were not idle in the meantime, and began selling off many of BR’s non-core operations. Some of these sales raised substantial sums (for example, BR Hotels raised £150m in 1999/00 prices).
The debate on privatizing the core railway operations continued throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1992, immediately following the surprise Conservative election victory, a White Paper, ‘New Opportunities for the Railways’ (Department of Transport), was quickly put together under the direction of the John MacGregor (then Secretary of State for Transport). The strong likelihood that the Conservatives would lose the subsequent election (1997) injected urgency into the process, as the government sought to complete the sale of the industry in one Parliament – and thus make privatization effectively irreversible.
The 1992 White Paper outlined the government’s privatization objectives, which were similar to those for previous sell-offs: to harness the skills of private sector management, in order to achieve greater responsiveness to customer needs, higher service quality, improved efficiency and better value for money. The introduction of competition was thought to be the best way of achieving these objectives (following the example of the electricity restructuring in 1990), although it was recognized that regulation would be required to protect consumers (especially with regard to safety).
As a result, the industry was separated (vertically and horizontally) into more than one hundred companies, to allow competition to develop in the contestable elements of the business. The restructuring was carried out initially within the public sector, creating shadow companies, which were later sold.
The most significant change was the separation of control of the track infrastructure (natural monopoly) from train operation (contestable). In 1994, most of the fixed railway infrastructure assets were transferred to a new company, Railtrack, separate from BR, but still wholly owned by Government. The company was sold by public offer in 1996.
At the same time, BR’s infrastructure services were reorganized into seven-infrastructure maintenance and six track renewal companies (sold between February and July 1996). BR’s rolling stock was divided into three leasing companies (ROSCOs). The ROSCOs (sold in January/February 1996) lease locomotives and carriages to the passenger train operating companies. Six heavy maintenance depots (provide services to ROSCOs) were also sold in April and June 1995. The right to run passenger train services was franchised to 25 private sector train operating companies (TOCs) - with open-access competition to be introduced gradually under the “moderation of competition” rules laid down by the Regulator (from 1995 onwards). TOCs lease almost all of their rolling stock from the ROSCOs, and pay Railtrack for access to track and stations. Red Star Parcels was sold to a management buy-out in September 1995. Freight operations were separated into six companies (later consolidated into two) and sold between December 1995 and November 1997 (with open-access competition allowed from the outset). In addition, many other BR central services operations were sold to private sector companies or management teams.
As part of the reorganization, two regulatory bodies were also created: (1) The Office of Rail Regulator (ORR), principally to regulate the monopoly element of the business - Railtrack; and (2) The Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), mainly responsible for awarding franchises, paying subsidies, and regulating the TOCs. Rail Users’ Consultative Committees (RUCCs) were established to work with OPRAF in protecting the interests of rail users. Safety regulation was placed with the Health & Safety Executive.
Since privatization industry outputs have increased substantially (reversing a long-term trend of decline), whilst costs have fallen in real terms. The new structure gave the TOCs strong incentives to increase outputs and reduce costs (because of declining subsidies; fixed access charges). Whilst part of the output growth since the mid 1990s can be attributed to privatization itself - through, for example, fare regulation and better marketing
Michael g. Pollitt and Andrew S. J. Smith1 have conclude that:
1. Industry outputs have risen sharply since privatization (1992/93 to 1999/00). Passenger train miles, passenger miles and freight tonne miles have grown by 13%, 21% and 19% respectively. At the same time, the cost base has been reduced by 6% in real terms. As a result, unit costs have fallen sharply over the period, by 17% (or 2.7% per annum). After taking account of scale effects, the rail industry has achieved efficiency savings of 13% (or 2% per annum) since privatization.
2. The post-privatization performance on efficiency has been significantly better than that achieved under public ownership. During the five years prior to privatization, unit costs went up by approximately 1% per annum (after stripping out the impact of scale effects).
3. In the central scenario, privatization and restructuring has generated efficiency savings
to date of about £800m, compared to the counterfactual of continued public ownership. The savings, achieved over only four years, are more than offset by restructuring costs. However, assuming that the savings achieved to date are rolled forward into the future (though declining to zero over 15 years as the public sector catches up), the total savings rise to £2.5bn under the central scenario (pre-restructuring), or £1.1bn after restructuring costs.
4. Consumers have benefited considerably from privatization (£1.2bn) – indeed by more than the level of savings. In present situation producers and government together lose £100m, with the government losing £300m, whilst producers gain £200m.
5. Output quality has improved since privatization (pre-Hatfield). Train performance has improved significantly, whilst the evidence from the 1980s suggests that it would have deteriorated under the old BR structure. Although overcrowding has got worse, it was argue that the same would have happened under public ownership, given the level of passenger growth. The increase in the number of broken rails has also resulted from increased traffic growth; however, it is unclear whether extra money would have been forthcoming to address this issue in the public sector. Finally, despite concerns over safety, the Cullen report – written after the Hatfield disaster - found safety performance to be (statistically) the same before and after privatization.
Of course, post-Hatfield, train performance has worsened dramatically. This position has resulted partly from the lack of an adequate asset register, which led Railtrack to close down large parts of the network. However, it also reflects a reduction in risk tolerance since privatization. Whilst British Rail may not have taken the same action as Railtrack, passengers may have been subjected to higher risk as a result. The value of this reduced risk is often ignored and is difficult to quantify.
Looking forward, the Periodic Review (2000) envisaged a significant increase in investment in the network, to deliver improved safety systems, and better performance. There have also been suggestions that long-term costs may have risen in the aftermath of Hatfield. However, this cost increases largely affect capital, not operating costs. Furthermore, the Periodic Review also committed Railtrack to deliver significant efficiency savings in the coming years.
The achievement of further efficiencies in the future will be key to delivering the government’s objective to improve rail services. Thus a privatized structure, where shareholders demand a return on their investment, has led to significant improvements in operating efficiency - it remains to be seen whether the new regime, with a not-for-profit infrastructure owner, will deliver the same efficiency improvements.
The U. S. A.
In the US, private railroad companies own both tracks and the trains that run over them. A particular location may be served by one or many railroads, and it is common for a pair of major cities to have two or sometimes three “parallel” railroads operating between them, competing for customers. Furthermore, it is not always necessary for one railroad to serve a shipper “directly” to provide service, or to provide competition to a second railroad; depending on the characteristics of the commodity, shippers may send their goods many miles by truck or water to or from a second rail line. For many commodities (especially manufactured goods) over many routes (especially shorter ones), motor carriers provide intense competition to rail carriers for the entire haul, or indeed may have already taken most of the business away from the railroads. In some locations, water carriers provide strong competition to rail. Most tariffs have been deregulated, and are set in contracts between railroads and shippers. At particular locations with multiple shippers -- such as a city – the individual railroads may agree among each other to form a “switching area”, where each railroad may run its train on each other railroad’s track to reach shippers located there (or the switching area track may be jointly owned by the local government, or by the railroads that use it). However, it is an important part of the US system that most such arrangements for “trackage rights” by one railroad company over another company’s tracks are voluntary and mutually agreed upon. “Compulsory” trackage rights, that is, access mandated by a government regulatory agency, are less common. When they do occur, they do so typically either a) as a competitive condition placed upon the merger of two railroad companies, as the regulator seeks to maintain competitive options for a particular shipper, or b) if a particular shipper can satisfy the difficult regulatory requirement necessary to prove that it is economically “captive” to a single railroad -- that is, that it has no economic alternative, via either rail or other transport mode, to that railroad for the haulage of its inputs and/or outputs. Even in those rare cases where competitive access is mandated, there may be lengthy regulatory or court proceedings to arrive at the price to be paid for access.
The Canadian System.
Most rail traffic in Canada travels over one of only two major privately owned carriers, the Canadian National Railway and the Canadian Pacific Railway. As in the US, each railroad runs its own trains over its own track. A large amount of rail traffic flows between Canada and the US, and each Canadian railroad has various connections with US railroads for interlining traffic. Furthermore, both major Canadian railroads own significant amounts of track in the US, and two US carriers have track networks that extend into Canada. Perhaps the most important difference between the Canadian and the American systems regarding competition is that in Canada, shippers located on one of the railroads but within 30 km of the other are automatically eligible to receive either service by the second railroad over the tracks of the first or service by the first that interlines with the second, both at regulated rates.
Brazil
Brazil has three gauges of rail track totaling about 32,000 kilometers of which about 2,000 kilometers are electrified. The different gauges used are 1,600 mm (5,000 kilometers), 1,440 mm (200 kilometers) and 1,000 mm (26,000 kilometers). The entire railway system covers mostly the eastern part of the country serving the ports on the South Atlantic coast. The central and western part of the country does not have any railway system. The road lobby is understood to be very influential in Brazil. 82 percent of the freight traffic is carried by road leaving the rest mainly to rail-based transportation and to water-borne movement along the Amazon. Separate private companies own most of the main line routes and only metro rail in major cities are owned by the respective municipalities. The urban areas are giving way to more and more road space shrinking the available area for housing people. Thus the cities and towns are getting overcrowded with road bottlenecks, similar to trends witnessed elsewhere in 'urbanizing' cities. This has hampered the movement of freight traffic to strategic ports; augmentation of the rail network is a priority for the state governments.
China
China has a total of about 72,000 kilometers of railway lines of which standard gauge (1,435 mm) is 68,000 kilometers while the rest are of 1,000 mm gauge. The population density in the eastern part of the country is denser than the rest of the country. The rail network is correspondingly denser in the eastern part. Being about three times larger in area than India, the population of China is more distributed and thus the route kilometers of railways per million of the population is only about 55 kilometers as against about 65 kilometers in India. The Chinese government operates about 60,000 kilometers; private players operate the rest. Rail freight traffic in China was of the order of 2,100 million tons as compared to 602 million tons by Indian Railways in the financial year 2005-06. China is focusing on the implementation of the 1,300 kilometers connection between Shanghai and Beijing. A separate dedicated high-speed rail corridor is also being constructed for commuting between the cities. The present operating speed on the rail network is about 160 kilometers per hour but China intends to augment this to about 300 kilometers per hour by 2010.
Australia
Australia is twice as large as India in area and has a total of about 45,000 kilometers of railways. Most of the northern part of Australia being arid and a desert, the population is concentrated in the eastern and southern coast. The iron ore and coal reserves are in the south and southwest regions. In order to optimize the total logistics, a substantial quantity of the material moves by rail to both the east and west coast almost along the entire southern belt of the country. For operational economies, Australian Railway companies operate very long freight trains carrying a payload of more than 25,000 tons powered by three or four locos distributed along the length of the train. The locos are controlled wirelessly. High-speed trains are mainly confined to connecting the metro cities on the southeastern part of the country such as Melbourne, Sydney, Canberra and Brisbane.
According to Pittman1 many Latin American countries have reformed their railways without relying on vertical access or vertical separation to create competition. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, the restructured railways systems are made up of multiple vertically integrated railway companies that compete with each other primarily at common points. Shippers to or from Mexico City, for example, can choose among three independent, vertically integrated railroad companies to carry their commodities, and this ‘geographic’ or ‘source’ competition, in addition to US-style ‘parallel’ competition in limited areas, has proved surprisingly successful in limiting the market power of individual railroad companies. Based on the experience in Latin America and North America, the creation of vertically integrated, competing railway companies in Russia, would seem likely to have two additional outcomes that are especially attractive. First, and perhaps contrary to expectations, it seems to be easier for the price discrimination that may be necessary to pay for the fixed infrastructure in the railroad sector to be done implicitly by vertically integrated companies, in the form of differentiated charges to shippers, rather than explicitly by infrastructure companies, in the form of differentiated access charges. In addition to problems with competition authorities, as discussed above, the experience in both the UK and Australia with small numbers negotiations in setting differentiated access charges suggests that the transactions costs of such an approach may be very high.
Second, one of the advantages of the Canadian and US systems of competition among vertically integrated railroad companies has been the ability of these companies to cover there fixed costs and make new investments. The same has already been observed in some of the reforming Latin American countries, where, for example, in both Brazil and Mexico the railway systems have moved in a few short years from draining the government treasuries to attracting hundreds of millions of dollars of private investment funds and paying taxes. It may be very difficult for railways in Russia and other transition and developing countries to achieve simultaneously the goals of reformers under models of vertical access and separation. This is in part a problem of regulatory capabilities and in part a problem of the huge amounts of investment required by a modern railway system. For this and other reasons, alternative models of restructuring that maintain vertical integration in the rail sector are worth serious consideration
General Overview of Indian Railways Compared with Other Railways of the World.
The above international comparison and description indicate that different countries have followed different model for reforming their railway system. However privatization of Railways has been a common theme. K P M G1 report on the Indian Railways says that taking into account the holistic picture of economic development, population distribution, raw material availability, location of industries and all other factors influencing material transport prospects, India appears to be unique in most respects. The population density in the southern part of the peninsula is high and coal, iron ore and other mineral resources are concentrated in the Bengal, Bihar and Jharkhand areas. Major industries and power plants are distributed almost throughout the country. This unique feature presents enormous opportunities for the transport of people and material across the country, in all directions. India also has an ancient history - the heritage locations and international tour promoters adding to the demand for most sophisticated passenger comfort showcase pilgrimage and other historic centers to the world. The popular Palace on Wheels is an example of the potential. Pilgrim specials are run across the country almost throughout the year at various seasons to different destinations. Many new 'tourist' trains on the lines of the Palace on Wheels are also being planned. In such situation any reform or liberalization within government control seems to be more appropriate for the railway reform rather than complete privatization.
Critical Question: Sustainability
Here comes the most important part of our study. Whether the turn around which the Indian Railways have made is going to sustain for long or was it a one-time affair, which is not going to be repeated year after year.
Indian Economy: In a Phase of Higher Growth
It may be noted that the Indian Railways have been able to achieve turn round when the Indian Economy was in a boom phase. Sometime after 2004 Indian Economy has crossed the restrictive growth rate of 5% or less. Coinciding with that the performance of the Indian Railways has also registered a phase of higher growth. Hence the growth of India Railways is somewhat dependent on the growth of Indian economy. If due to any reasons the growth of Indian economy is disturbed or stalled then the performance of the Indian Railways will also, if not totally disturbed, affected. For the Railways it will be much tougher to sustain this growth rate. This was illustrated in the growth pattern as seen during 2004-05 to 2009-10. After 2008-09 when the global economy was hit by the meltdown affect there was cascading affect on Indian economy which in turn has also affected the IR.

The Role of Present Leadership
For making turnaround happen the role of leadership is very important. Some of the critical decisions which was taken in the past have played very important role. For instance for taking decisions like increasing the loading capacity of the wagons lot of resistance was there from several departments with in Railway. Although the Railways have a very systematic bureaucratic hierarchy of three tier at divisional, zonal and Railway Board level the badly needed decision came from the top. It was good that the Railways have got proper leadership at an appropriate time. However this kind of good coincidence may not always be possible. According to Prof. Raghuram1 ‘the strategies and processes can be sustained if the political leadership is well intentioned and has consistency of direction. Political leadership does not come in through a controlled process. The need is for the professional top management (RB) to be able to respond as a commercially oriented organization with a corporate culture’.
Organizational Restructuring
G Raghuram and Niraja Shukla2 have argued that while IR is well set in terms of the human resources and a lot of systems, it does not have the structure for a corporate approach. The initiative of increasing the axle loading had to be triggered by the MR and his office, rather than emerge as an in house strategic decision. ‘Departmentalism’ is the major issue that comes in the way of the IR’s ability to take strategic decisions from within. Further, top officials generally have short tenures. Given the relationship between political leadership and Railway Board (RB), short tenures hinder the consistency of initiatives. IR needs to redesign its organizational structure to bring a corporate perspective at higher levels. This would call for redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of the top management towards a business perspective rather than a functional perspective. They have recommended that even though IR has performed well in the past two years, there is need for organizational restructuring.
Apart from a faster growing economy, consistency of leadership by the MR and a professionally responsive RB worked well in turning around IR. However, if the political leadership changes, how IR will respond is a big question. There is need for a system which focuses on continued innovation and not just on current strategic initiatives. Unfortunately, political leadership is not an outcome of a controlled process. Hence, the technocracy has to develop the capability for continuous innovation. There is also need for IR to become a commercially oriented organization with a corporate culture. Strategies and processes have to be customer centric and scientifically based.
Predominance of Supplier Driven Initiatives
All the initiatives for ensuring turnaround has been taken form the railways’ side i.e. the entire process was supplier driven and not as per the wish of customers. This makes entire process as one sided and in this the entire system becomes dependent on the mood of single party. There are several issues, which are badly affecting customers. But in those issues the views of customers have not been given much importance. It may be noted that for Railways’ goods traffic five or six commodities are very important and six top loading divisions are vary important. For increasing share further it is very important that all problems being faced by these commodities and divisions has to be solved in a mission approach.
Slow Progress in Port connectivity
The highest growth in demand of the Railways services has been in port sector. This sector is likely to give more and more demand, as India’s international trade is likely to increase many times. Despite making so much efforts the Railways have not been able to provide substantial improvement in its services. Nor there is any substantial improvement in the connectivity between four metropolitan cities i.e. Delhi, Mumbai Chennai and Kolkata. Although the Railways have many projects to improve these further, the success of Railways depends on the fact that how early these projects are logically concluded further.
According to G. Raghuram and Rachana Gangwar1 ‘India’s Port originating traffic is 68.9 (58.8) mt and port terminating traffic is 74.1 (70.7) mt, accounting for a total of 143.0 (129.5) mt, which is about 10.7 (10.8) percent of IR’s traffic. The port as a significant client needs to be recognized in this framework, since otherwise IR tends to look at clients at the originating side.
IR has opportunities to increase its traffic volumes and market share in port traffic. Apart from increasing line capacity on the rail route to the hinterland (which the IR were already considering through appropriate infrastructure investments), it would also be important to develop appropriate customer oriented systems and other infrastructure. The strategies that IR needs to adopt for this would emerge as a result of understanding the supply chain requirements of the major commodities being handled at these ports.
India’s international trade is going up. Port traffic is also going up, both due to international trade and coastal movement. IR’s market share of domestic movement is going down. IR has a market share of about 30 percent of the port traffic for hinterland movement1. Port traffic is largely bulk and containers and IR has expertise in this. There is potential for IR to focus on port-based traffic and develop a sustainable niche. The mode choice for traffic from and to the hinterland is based on lead to/from port, freight rates, volume per shipment, availability of wagons and services at the customer interface’. The Railways have to initiate specific and speedy measures to retain and further capture this market.
Increasing Axle Load Further
One of the major source or reason of the Railways turnaround has been increasing the axle load and carrying capacity to CC + 8 + 2 tonnes. This turnaround can be sustainable further only when the loading limits are relaxed further and loading capacity of different wagons, track, bridges etc. are improved further.
According to G. Raghuram and Niraja Shukla2 ‘the increased axle load had been viewed as a net revenue generator, with marginal revenues far exceeding marginal costs. Increasing loadability for a given axle load by improving the net to tare ratio from the current 2.7 (to possibly around 4) could be a possible technological solution. For a 92 ton gross weight, if the wagon weight could be brought down to 18 tons, the loadability would go up to 74 tons. Long-term possibilities were increasing the axle load to 25 tons and then 30 tons. These would require adoption of new technologies, apart from planning future rail construction and wagon procurement activity to meet the required parameters. The concept of multiaxle vehicles, which was popular on roads, could also a possibility of on rail. Thus IR faced several immediate future priorities: better instrumentation, and studies and to determine the impact of higher axle loading on bridges, track, and wagons’. However, before we increase such limits proper assessment of cost owing to increased fuel consumption, increased wagon and track maintenance, increased investments in wagons, tracks and bridges, instrumentation, monitoring and studies, and ill effects of increased breakdowns has to be done. The strength and safety of bridges is one of the critical factors, which have to be kept in mind.
‘At 22.9 tons axle load, up to 67 tons can be loaded today in a wagon (in comparison to earlier loading of 56 tons, taking an average of 25 tons of tare weight). There are plans for increasing it further to 25t and 30t per axle loading in the proposed dedicated freight corridors. This would require certain infrastructural changes and safety issues to be addressed, even though some of the experts says that IR tracks are fit for 30 tons and 32.5 tons per axle loading with certain modifications like increasing ballast, replacing sleepers, etc. Improved net to tare weight ratio, multiaxle vehicles, and utilizing maximum moving dimensions are the areas of research for increasing further loadability’2.
Early Completion of Dedicated Freight Corridor
It is high time for the Railways for the early finalization of dedicated freight corridor to meet the high congestion situation between different metropolitan cities. The high-density Eastern and Western corridors are already saturated in terms of line capacity utilization. Accelerated growth of the economy is only adding to the congestion on these routes. A quantum jump in capacity is, therefore, necessary for meeting the rising freight demand on account of robust domestic growth as well as the rapid increase in international trade. Railways have planned to construct a new Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC), initially covering about 2700 route kms. equivalent to over 5000 of Track kms at an approximate Cost of Rs. 22,000 crores, linking the ports of western Indian and the ports and mines of Eastern India to Delhi and Punjab. The construction of this corridor is under implementation through an SPV being created for the purpose through a mix of Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) and PPP methods. Indian Railways was in the process of selecting a global consultant to advise on the concession agreement, principles of track access charges and other financing and bidding issues. It was envisaged that innovative ideas on design, construction and maintenance of railway to achieve optimal life – cycle costs would be forthcoming through PPP especially as the work progresses on the initial two corridors and further corridors are taken up. The concessionaire could also tap additional ancillary revenue streams through commercial exploitation of land, construction of freight terminals/logistic parks/ICDs etc. Further, after firming up a wagon design for the DFC, private investment for its manufacture would be encouraged. All possible options, including PPP route through appropriate models was being considered.

Increasing Passenger Coaches
One of the main reasons of passenger growth in recent year has been increasing the number of coaches in most popular trains to 24 coaches. To take benefit of this it is necessary that even other trains are extended this benefit. However, the pace of this conversion has been rather slow. This is required to be speeded up. The Railways also require canceling some of the less popular and unpopular trains to save totally unwarranted expenditure. However this would not be much easy.
Providing Total Logistic Support
Today the Railways are facing tough challenge from the road sector, which has taken over most of the goods traffic share from the railways. One of the good things of the road sector has been that they, most of the time, act as total logistic solution provider. They pick up the goods from the doorstep of the customers and after reaching to the destination they deliver to the customer at their doorstep. However this has not been so in the Railways. Here, the party is supposed to bring their commodities to the good shed by road and after reaching at the destination again they are supposed to empty the entire rake by 6 to 8 hours and vacate the good shed within 24 hours. This again involves road movement. Except “container services” Railways does not provide any totally logistic solution. With increased or round the clock working hour many customer find it rather difficult to adjust. To make the Railways customer oriented the Railways have to make some arrangement for providing total logistic support. This has become more important since now there is greater requirement for mechanized loading and unloading of consignment to avoid warfage and demurrage. For an individual customer it may be difficult to have all these mechanized facilities. Whereas, if the Railways make some institutional arrangement with some Private Sector players it would be much convenient for any party to take full benefit of the railways’ services. In the beginning, we may provide as a pilot project in some big and busy good shed and on the basis of experience gained over there it may be replicated at other locations. Sooner or later, the Railways have to realize that until unless they emerge as total logistic provider they will not be able to compete with the Road.
Commercial utilization of land
Indian Railways has approximately 43,000 hectares of vacant land. These are mostly situated alongside the tracks in a longitudinal strips, around railway stations and in railway colonies especially in metro and other important cities / towns with potential of being used commercially to generate revenue as well as capital for modernization and capacity addition. An authority, namely, Rail Land Development Authority (RLDA) was set up under the Railway (Amendment) Act 2005 to pursue, inter alia, the main objectives of generating revenue, up grading railway assets and providing world – class, state – of – the – art passenger facilities / services at stations.
In fact in big Metro City like Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai etc. Railway should modernized to provide world – class passenger amenities and services to the large multitude of passengers using these stations. The Ministry is planning to do so by attracting private investments in the area by allowing the areas around the stations and the air space above platform to be commercially developed while operational / passenger – handling areas are separated from such commercial areas as in the case of airports. The concessionaire would be expected to construct and maintain the operational and passenger areas free of cost, share the revenue earned from the real estate created and hand over the same after the concession period. The pilot project for New Delhi Station is on the anvil and on the basis of this experience it is required to be replicated for other stations. Development of new green field passenger terminals is also required to be taken up in a similar manner.
Customer Orientation
The Railways still works with suppliers’ market mentality. Different terms and condition are made as per the convenience of the Railways. Laid down rules don’t permit for molding different restrictions for the benefit of the customer. Whereas, the expectation of different customers are gradually increasing and they want personalized favor as they get it from private truck operators. Being a government department, Railway officials don’t have such liberty. However, to meet the expectation and to compete with the private road operators Railway officials are gradually required to be given some discretionary powers. G. Raghuram1 has mentioned some of the expectations. Siding owners, as key customers of the IR, often put forth the following requirements from railway operations.
• Supply of wagons: IR should supply the stock asked for with little or no delay. Open wagons should not be supplied against request for covered wagons. The supplies should be arranged with little or no bunching.
• Transit time guarantee: "Just In Time" approach is becoming important to the cement industry to eliminate inventory costs. This requires transit time guarantees and even containerization.
• No restrictions on free flow of goods: The traffic must move freely, determined by market forces and not by IR. For example, if food grain loading picks up from Firozpur division, loading of covered wagons outward Mughalsarai runs into difficulties. Similarly, frequent restrictions are imposed on movement to individual railway destinations where a quota is applicable. If it is a capacity problem, what have the IR done to remove the bottlenecks? If it is a problem of terminals, what can the IR and industry do?
• Rail connections to minor ports: Traffic will start moving in a big manner to the interiors from the ports, especially coastal traffic from and to the minor ports. Therefore, transport infrastructure planning not only for the major ports but also the minor ports is important.
• Claims settlement: IR’s record for claim settlement is poor. For example, when wagons are involved in accidents due to suspected sabotage, IR are not willing to refund the freight and also not willing to prove that the unloaded goods were taken care of as required by law. The result is that the industry is fighting cases in the claims tribunal and adding to the workload on the both sides.
Suggestion given in the above study is important and the IR may decide future policy in the above prospective. Since in the coming years the Railways have to accept customer as king so gradually they have to amend different laws to incorporate proper solution to these elements.
More Leasing of Parcel Services
Since April 2005 Railways have been following the policy of leasing of S L R as the Railways was making heavy losses. Hardly 25% S L R capacity utilization was being utilized and only about 500 crore was being earned whereas the potentialities was for 25000 crore. However, despite some progress not more than 40 % S L R space has been leased. Many less important express trains and most of the passenger trains are yet be covered under leasing. Hence, the Railways have to expedite the progress of leasing of S L R to get proper benefit. Further Railway should try to provide total logistic solution to the parcel service customer to make it truly attractive. Railways may make arrangement with some trucks operarators to provide road part of services as per the Railway fixed rate. This will increase the credibility of the Railways services tremendously.

Thus we may conclude that at this stage the Indian Railway does not need privatization as it was done in the U. K. or in the U S A or Russia. Rather, its recent attempts to improve have brought some improvements. Hence the IR should continue to reform itself further. The turn around of the Railways can be sustainable only when those listed items are achieved within given time. If any undue delay takes place or if the task is left in the mid way it may lead to very serious consequence. To save the Railway from privatization and serious hardship of the common population the IR have to achieve the transformational goal of Railway even before its due date.
Bibliography
G. Raghuram and Rachana Gangwar- Marketing Strategies for Freight Traffic on Indian Railways: A Systems Perspective W.P. No. 2007- 07-03, July 2007 Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.
G. Raghuram and Niraja Shukla -‘Turnaround’ of Indian Railways: Increasing the Axle Loading W.P. No.2007-05-03 May 2007. Indian Institute Of Management, Ahmedabad.
G Raghuram -Experiences of Various Forms of Commercial Partnerships in Indian Railways Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
KPMG–International Railway Conference –A Background Note New Delhi 2007I
Michael g. Pollitt and Andrew S. J. Smith - The Restructuring and Privatization of British Rail: Was it really that bad? Judge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge. DAE Working Paper 0118
MOR (2007). ‘Indian Railways Year Book 2005-06,’ Ministry of Railways, Government of India, New Delhi.
Ministry of Railways- Indian Railways –Opportunities and Challenges 2006
Planning Commission - ‘Report of the Committee of Secretaries: Road Rail Connectivity of Major Ports,’ The Secretariat for the Committee on Infrastructure, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi 2006.
Russell Pittman - Russian Railways Reform and the Problem of non-discriminatory Access to Infrastructure- Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 75:2 2004
Russell Pittman - Chinese Railway Reform and Competition: Vertical or Horizontal Restructuring. New York: Columbia University (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law LXVI:2) 2002

Saxena R N (1985). ‘Rail Transport Pricing in India,’ Meeranjani Publications, New Delhi

Introduce Regulator in Indian Railways by U.S.Jha. IRTS M.Phil PGPPM

Introduce Regulator in Indian Railways

With the growing trend of globalization, privatization and liberalization since 1980 government in many countries have recognized the need to reassess the performance of the infrastructure sector- until recently, infrastructure services including railways were developed and provided by natural monopolies. However, the experiences of many countries have shown that a competitive market can deliver these services in an effective manner. Private investment and separate regulation, a new form of governance in infrastructure sectors, which evolved during the last few decades in the U S, U K, and some Latin American countries, are required to be pursued even in India. It may be noted that the attempt of private investment in the Indian Railways (IR) and creation of a regulator is not going to be a smooth sailing and the barriers and challenges to such initiatives are going to be many, especially where there is no long history of good governance. However, one need not to be pessimistic and despite all odds India can develop own Indian model and can make it successful.

When one look around, in the initial years of regulatory experience in India, the general perception is that regulatory agencies have had little positive influence on sectoral growth and development. The causes are complex and sector-dependent, but include, among others, a combination of lack of regulator independence, credibility, enforcement authority and accountability. Despite some amount of participation by the private sector in the recent past, infrastructure industries in India are dominated by state-owned entities. They have been, no doubt, undergoing some transformation, through increased private participation and market development. In this process regulation has been and will continue to be essential to bring credibility, certainty and sound rationale to the terms and conditions of private sector involvement and market development, while also insulating them from government interference. Where privatization and private investment takes place, the contract negotiation process is often politicized and opaque. As experienced in other countries, regulation has leaned heavily toward private sector promotion and protection, often without much success, and at the expense of consumer interests. Virtually there are insufficient checks and balances in the current regulatory framework (even though lip service to that effect exists in various applicable laws) to protect consumer interests. Regulatory procedure needs to be better formalizing into a more transparent and accountable process of governance (Narasimha Rao and Subhashish Gupta, 2005).

Meaning of Regulation

Before one enters in this debate it would be interesting to analyze the meaning of regulation. According to Selznick, regulation is sustained and focused control exercise by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community. For Baldwin and Cave regulation is an activity that restricts behaviour and prevents the occurrence of certain undesirable activities. Regulation may also be enabling of or facilitative to conduct operations in an ordered manner rather than left to the potential chaos of an uncontrolled market (1999, PP-2). Motives for regulation can be different from the technical justification. Whenever there is monopolistic or natural monopolistic situation with windfall profit or prevalence of externalities, information inadequacies, anti competitive behaviour and predatory pricing, unequal bargaining power, scarcity or question of continuity and availability of services, coordination and planning the need for regulation arises. There are several theories to explain regulation. Public interest theorists (J. M. Landis, I. McLean and C. Foster etc.) believe that the purpose of regulation is to achieve certain publicly desired results in circumstances where, the market would fail to yield these. Interest group theorists (Mitnick, M. H. Bernstein, G. Wilson, Francis, P. Self, O. Newman, L. Hancher and M. Moran) see regulatory developments as the product of relationships between different groups and the state from open-ended pluralism to corporatism. Private interest theorists (George Stigler and Sam Peltzman, R. Posner, W.A. Jordan, G. Becker, etc.) stress the extant to which regulatory developments are driven by the pursuit not of public or group but of private interests. Institutional theorists (J. March, and J. Olsen, J. Meyer and B. Rowan, W. Scott, T.A. Koelble, etc) centre on the notion that institutional structure and arrangements, as well as social processes, significantly shape regulation – that there is more deriving regulatory developments than mere aggregations of individuals preferences.

A state or other agency adopts the following methods for regulation: -

  • To command – where legal authority and the command of law is used to pursue policy objectives.
  • To deploy wealth – where contracts, grants loans, subsidies, or other incentives are used to influence conduct.
  • To harness markets-where governments channel competitive forces to particular ends.
  • To inform – where information is deployed strategically.
  • To act directly – where the state takes physical action itself.
  • To confer protected rights – where rights and liability rules are structured and allocated so as to create desired incentives and constraints. (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, PP: 3-45)

Thus, regulation provides perspective for private investment, safeguard of investors’ interest and protection of consumer interest.

Railways in India

Although railways in India started as private initiatives, it was nationalized during the British period itself in the year 1886 with a view that the facilities required for rendering infrastructure services were natural monopolies and a single provider would be able to offer them economically. It was believed that vertically and horizontally integrated units would be better placed to provide these core services. Besides serving the colonial British interest and military needs of British imperialism it was also believed that monopoly power in such core areas should rest with the public sector to protect the consumer from exploitation by the profit motive of a private provider.

Although Indian Railways (IR) is considered to be the most efficient government department asserting the presence of the integrating factor of the Indian state, and its reputation is as a department which can deliver services properly with making profit year after year and contributing to the government exchequer. But when we compare this, with some developed countries like France, Germany, the U S A or even China we find that some thing is missing in the IR. One may feel that the absence of competition over the year has led to operational inefficiencies, poor quality of services and inefficient allocation of resources. IR’s inability to provide good quality services stymied economic growth and adversely affected India’s competitiveness in the rapid globalization-taking place. Quite often the prevailing bottleneck between the four metropolitans and diagonals and some other busy routes and poor quality of infrastructure framework has affected India’s economic growth including de-motivating prospective investors to invest in India. Some of the specific constraints being felt in IR were: -

· An increasing inability to fund much needed expansions, particularly between the four metropolitans and diagonals and some other busy routes.

· Inadequacy of budgetary allocation for infrastructure development of IR.

· Need for additional resources to finance the new projects of IR.

· Non-assured, non-guaranteed or poor quality of services largely due to managerial and worker apathy towards the consumers. This lead to inability of IR to provide transport services in an efficient and commercially sound manner.

· The inability of IR to benefit from technological changes, like high-speed trains of France or Germany or heavy haul goods trains.

· The increasing need for high quality infrastructure services to remain globally competitive. No doubt, there is need for efficient and cost effective transport services in an efficient and commercially sound manner.

An assessment of the performance of some of the developed countries like USA, Japan, UK, France, Germany etc railways’ system and other infrastructure sector like telecom, electricity, air transportation etc in many countries lead to the belief that market forces and competition could improve the provision and delivery of services without affecting the economies of scale. Besides, several technological advancements have taken place that has altered the traditional perceptions about economies of scale. These changes have enabled an unbundling of the sector, hitherto not considered to be feasible and permitted a separation of natural monopolies from those that are not necessarily so. Such an unbundling has permitted competition in segments that are not natural monopolies. (Agarwal and Paul, 2001: pp3-15).

Fear of Privatization and Stunted Growth

Given the restricted growth of Railways in post independence India, there is significant need for private investment. However privatization and foreign investment in the railways are viewed with lot of skepticism, as the common fear is that privatization will lead to unemployment and foreign investment will lead to draining out of national wealth to foreign country. At the same time a small subsidy or petty budgetary support is not helping IR to grow in a robust manner. There is great paucity of fund for the development purpose and to meet the challenge of the growing economy, which is illustrated by the fact that the share of road traffic has been growing continuously since independence. In 1951 IR was carrying 89% of freight traffic and 80% of the passenger traffic. However, with the economic development and increase in GDP along with increased activities of the private sector this monopoly has started dwindling down. Today IR faces tough competition from the road sector and most of the traffic has shifted to the road. In 1951-52 the road was carrying 11% of freight traffic and 20% of passenger traffic. By 1996-97 this share of road has improved phenomenally and it was carrying 60% of freight and 80% of the passenger traffic.

Year after year IR is losing its share to the road sector as shown below: -

Table No. 1

Year

Combined Cargo

(Million Tonnes)

Railways

(Million Tonnes)

Roadways

(Million Tonnes)

Rail-share (%)

Road-share (%)

2001-02

2046.10

492.50

1553.60

24.07

75.93

2002-03

2194.18

518.48

1675.70

23.63

76.37

2003-04

2405.29

557.39

1847.90

23.17

76.83

2004-05

2665.09

601.89

2063.20

22.58

77.42

2005-06

2971.71

667.39

2304.32

22.46

77.54

2006-07

3464.25

728.41

2735.84

21.01

78.99

Source: The Economics Times 27th February 2008

Despite having best ever performance of freight loading of 790 MT in 2007-08 the share of Railways in total freight business has come down from 21.01% to 20% (approx). This is despite having best operating ratio of 76.3 %. Thus, there is certainly a need of looking beyond the existing framework or out of box thinking. If private participation and or deregulation measures can improve growth rates, then the employment curtailment argument does not hold good ground (Hazra 2000).

Adopting a realistic approach we have to accept the fact that in a democratic set up socialist goals are good, but should not be at the cost of development. Till date, inhibition for privatization has become a root cause of stunted growth of IR. Although complete privatization may not be correct policy initiative, we have to accept the fact that at this stage of economy when the government does not have sufficient fund to give full fledged development of the Railways, to extract the full benefits of the economic development or higher GDP growth or to facilitate higher GDP growth as infrastructure has been widely as a major bottleneck for the economic growth in India, we need to look something beyond. In this scenario, the role of government could not remain as that of a controller, but that of a facilitator. Thus the government should initiate deregulation and positive regulation so as to ensure proper or free and fair competition, which can translate into better services.

The Theoretical Analysis of IR

The basic functioning of IR can be evaluated on the prism of general equilibrium theory. This theory specifies the conditions under which the decisions of utility maximizing consumers and profit maximizing firms will lead to the inevitable, spontaneous establishment of equilibrium in all markets simultaneously. This is established only when competitive forces led to the equality of marginal benefit and marginal cost in the market for every single commodity and service. There is a direct link between general equilibrium theory and welfare economies.

Thus, general equilibrium is both productively, as well as allocatively efficient. From a consumer’s point of view, the proper functioning of market is beneficial. However if the conditions of competitions are not attained, it is possible for conditions of general equilibrium to hold. There are four conditions under which the market fails. They are – (a) monopoly and market power (b) externalities (c) public goods, and (d) severe informational asymmetries. These all condition exist in case of infrastructure facilities, Particularly railways in India. In this perspective the development of railways in India has not been on the line of the competitive demand and supply theory. Rather it has been developed as monopoly of state, or as ‘natural monopoly’ as it was felt that the growth could be more balanced and equitable if the railways function under single organization due to economies of scale.

Growth during British Era and Post Independent Era

Once the IR was accepted as ‘natural monopoly’ and got total government support that it made a very robust growth. From 39603 KM in 1900, it had gone up to 61232 KM in 1925 (This included railways lines of present day Pakistan and Bangladesh). At the present time the situation has changed drastically. In terms of route KM it has increased marginally from 54376 KM in 1947 to 63310 KM in 2007-08. Investment on IR no longer occupies a position of budgetary preponderance as in the pre-independence period. While the government expenditure on railways as a percentage of total public investment stood at 53.7% and 58.3% respectively in the period 1860-1918 and 1919-1946, according to 8th plan it stood at 6.1%. During 9th and 10th plan it went down further to 5.7% and 5.5 % respectively. During 11th plan (2007-2012) it is likely to be somewhere around 5%. (The transport sector allocation during 11th plan is Rs 572443 crore).

This kind of restrictive availability of fund for development has resulted in stunted growth of IR as illustrated in the following table: -

Table No. 2

Year

Popu-lation

(Crore)

GDP

(000 crore)

(At 1999-2000 Price)

Railways

Roadways

Route

Length

No. of

Coaches

No. of

Wagon

Length of

Roads

(000KM)

No. of Goods

Vehicle

(Thous

and)

No. of

Buses

(000)

1950-51

36.1

552

53596

19628

205596

400

82

34

1960-61

43.9

330

56247

28439

307907

525

168

57

1970-71

54.8

474

59709

35145

383990

915

343

94

1980-81

68.3

641

61240

38333

400946

1485

554

162

1990-91

84.6

1083

62367

38511

346102

1998

1356

331

2000-01

102.7

1864

63028

42675

222193

2447

2948

634

2003-04

107.2

2222

63221

46119

228170

2713

3748

768

2005-06

110.6

2612(pro.)

63310

--

--

--

4782

934

2006-07

112.2

2864(quick estimate)

--

--

--

--

--

--

Source: Economic Survey 2007-08. Table No. 0.1, 1.26, 1.28

It is clear from the above table that between 1950-51 and 2005-06 there has been three time increase in the population, five time increase in the GDP, seven time increase in the length of road, fifty eight time increase in the number of trucks, and twenty eight time increase in the number of buses. But in IR the growth has been abysmally low. IR’s route length has increased only 1.18 time, number of coaches increased only 2.35 time and number of wagons increased only 1.11 time. Now, when population is growing and economic activities are growing, particularly in last 10 years it is not possible to retain the same customer base. Although the IR has improved its productivity as shown in the following table its market share has declined as shown earlier

Table No. 4

Year a

Originating Traffic

(Million Tonnes)

Goods Carried

(Billion tonne-KM)

Goods Earning

(Rs. Crore)

Originating

Passenger

(Million)

Passenger

Kilometers

(Billion)

Passenger

Earning

(Rs. Crore)

1950-51

93

44

139

1284

67

98

1960-61

156

88

281

1594

78

132

1970-71

197

127

601

2431

118

296

1980-81

220

159

1551

3613

209

828

1990-91

341

243

8247

3858

296

3145

2000-01

504

316

23045

4833

457

10515

2003-04

581

384

27403

5112

541

13298

2004-05

626

411

30489

5378

576

14115

2005-06

682

442

35535

5725

616

15126

2006-07

745

483

41092

6219

695

17224

Source: Economic Survey 2007-08. Table No. 1.26,

It is obvious from the above table that IR has been able to increase its loading capacity of goods traffic and carrying capacity of passenger traffic many fold despite having minimal growth in its’ assets. This has been made possible by the better utilization of the assets by introducing measures like ‘providing discount in anti flow direction of wagons’, round the clock working hour, ‘upgradation of passengers in upper class to accommodate waitlisted passengers’ etc. These measures have helped not only in better turn round of wagons and coaches but also helped in achieving best ever operating ratio as can be seen in the following table: -

Table No.5

Years

Operating Ratio

2001-02

96.0

2002-03

92.3

2003-04

92.1

2004-05

91.0

2005-06

83.2

2006-07

78.7

2007-08

76.3

Source: The Economic Times, 27th Feb.2008

It is not that, the IR has identified all bottleneck points, which have been affecting its performance. These bottleneck points may be existing ether in its rule or in its operating practices, which leads to idling of its stock on the one hand, and unmet demands on the other hands. Proper managerial approach with goal of optimization of loading and earning to resolve such bottleneck is required, which the IR is gradually doing. But then there is a limit and such measures now can help only in having some marginal increase in its productivity. Undoubtedly, IR now badly needs surplus capacity generation to attract to retain its customer base and to attract or win back those customers who have moved out of its fold. As we have seen in the Table No.2 that there has been massive increase in the number of trucks, buses and road length and roadways is always ready to provide customized and personalized services to the customers on demand and with a kind of guarantee. Due to this, as we have seen in the Table No. 1 that the share of road traffic has grown phenomenally. For IR it has not been possible to cater its all present and potential customers, despite having very heavy demand, as per their needs as there is always shortage of wagon and passenger coaches in most of the months, particularly in peak seasons, which are, nowadays, more than six months a year. As an alternative these customers move to roadways for meeting their demand despite paying higher charges and lot more inconveniences. The kind of budgetary support, which IR gets from the Government of India and the kind of surplus IR has been able to generate, are far from meeting the developmental requirement. The following table gives the detail of budgetary support received from the Government of India.

Table No. 6

Plan

Year

Total Plan

Outlay

Internal

Generation

of IR

% Share of

Railways Budget

Govt. of India support

(Rs. Crore)

% of Govt. of India Budget

First Plan

1951-56

422

280

66.4

142

10.3

Second Plan

1956-61

1043

467

44.8

576

10.3

Third Plan

1961-66

1685

545

32.2

1140

10.3

Annual Plan

1966-69

762

320

42

458

10.3

Fourth Plan

1969-74

1428

397

27.8

1031

10.3

Fifth Plan

1974-79

1525

384

25.2

1141

5.3

Annual Plan

1979-80

1251

316

25.0

766

6

Sixth Plan

1980-85

6585

2783

42.3

6587

6.1

Seventh Plan

1985-90

16549

7089

42.8

16549

7.6

Annual Plan

1990-91

-

-

-

4892

8.4

Annual Plan

1991-92

-

-

-

5393

8.3

Eight Plan

1992-97

32306

18832

58.3

7313

6.3

Ninth Plan

1997-2002

46405

16352

35.2

15472

5.3

Tenth Plan

2002-07

-

-

-

64709

5.5

Eleventh Plan

2007-11

-

-

-

572443

Trans. sector


Source: Economic Survey 2007-08. Table No. 2.4 to 2.10 and Status Paper 2002 and Raghuram (2002)

Thus, we find that after independence, IR has not got sufficient fund for the proper development. Since the government decides the different rents, it has not been possible to generate more funds by raising freight or fare. Whatever, the budgetary support it has got from the Government of India, remained to be a paltry sum to meet some minor requirements. Although IR has tried some alternative strategies like market borrowings through the Indian Railways Finance Corporation and schemes like ‘Built Own Lease Transfer’ (BOLT), and ‘Own Your Wagon’ (OYW) these schemes have never caught fancy of the investors. Only in recent time ‘Public Private Partnership’ (PPP) has got some attention of the investing public with some successful examples of government –public partnership as it was seen in the case of Pipava Railways or Kutch Railways. Now when the mood of the investing public is positive, it is high time that the IR takes a positive decision to invite private investments in railways expansion and consolidation process. Railways have to realize and accept that attracting private sector investments into IR’s expansion to meet a part of the enormous fund requirement is very critical and important.

Need of Regulator in Indian Railways

At the same time IR has to concede that if private investment is to be attracted to infrastructure services like railways, it is important to mitigate the investors’ perception of risk, both financial and political by establishing a system of clear and credible risk to govern the operations of the sector and to ensure transparency in private participation deals. Although the IR has till date opposed the formation of a regulator we have to now accept that on matters of pricing, that are critical to the private investor decisions it is necessary to establish regulatory arrangements that are not only autonomous but are also in a position to exercise that autonomy and are free from any political interference. No doubt, there is need to have a private investment policy as well as one related to risk mitigation at the state level, both of which should be aligned with the best practices of those countries that have attracted such investment for infrastructure successfully (Kar Pratip in Sarkar and Kaushik ed. 2001:pp17-26).

Situation in Developed Countries

The experiences of the developed countries that have successfully built new infrastructure through private investment show that privately financed projects are not only alternatives to traditional forms of financing but also important tools for meeting national infrastructure needs. It was also noticed that, the conditions under which projects for a particular sector are executed have been devised, keeping in mind the overall policy of the host government for that sector. It may be noted that, national policies to promote private investment in infrastructure are often accompanied by measures to introduce competition between public service providers to prevent the monopolistic conditions. Competition reduces the cost and increases the productivity of infrastructure investment, also enhancing the responsiveness to the needs of customers.

Now, if IR wants to avail this benefit there is a rider. It is difficult to achieve all these benefits in the absence of a regulatory framework, or with the archaic legislation accompanied with over slow judicial system. One good thing about regulation in India has been that it takes on another challenge beyond managing private investment. That is, for some time to come the state-level regulatory system in India will be concerned largely with regulating state-owned utilities. This is because despite growth in participation of private sector, state-owned incumbents continue to own majority market shares in infrastructure industries and there would be lot of resistance from the existing staff for protecting their turf as they view any such attempt as end of their dominance (Narasimha Rao and Subhashish Gupta, 2005).

Some countries have chosen to separate the ownership and operation of infrastructure (tracks, signaling systems and train stations) from rail transport services (passenger and freight). Under these schemes, the law does not allow the track operator to operate transport services, which are operated by other companies, often in competition with each other. This helps in making every activity as self-dependent and vibrant to the need of the market or customers and removes all kinds of inefficiencies. The IR is yet to follow this model.

Some other countries have let integrated companies operate infrastructure as well as services, but have enforced third party access rights to the infrastructure, sometime called as trackage rights. In these cases, transport companies, whether a different rail line or transport service company, have the right to access the track on certain terms, and the company controlling the track is obliged to grant such access. Barrier to investment and operation in this sector are also being gradually removed (Kar. 2001). It may be noted that IR has started to adopt this strategy in 2007-08 when it permitted for the private container train operators, under some condition to access and avail the facility of IR on some charges. However, it has been noticed that these operators are facing lots of difficulties and in absence of any independent grievance settlement mechanism; these operators are bowing to the pressure tactics of IR. On the other hand, IR officials feel that these operators are acting on the turf of IR and are competing with IR only, which they feel is counter productive.

Formation of Sectoral Regulator

In view of the multiple and conflicting role of the government and above problems with available alternatives of solution the IR may adopt a strategy of forming a regulator. Ideally, formation of the regulator should be on sector basis. There should be a common regulator for transport sector, which should regulate all branches viz. railways, roadways, airways, waterways including shipping and ports, pipeline etc. The prime function of the regulator would be to see that there is proper and integrated development of transport infrastructure facility in India so that major infrastructure constraint and bottleneck is removed properly and fast. It can be given broad, enforceable mandate to oversee the project development process for multiple infrastructure sectors. This body can serve as a check on the compliance of projects with environmental and land-related regulations, contract design and implementation, quality standards, etc. This will also encourage a standardized method for tendering, contract terms, and distance decision-making from the vested interests in each ministry. It would also develop a common template for service contracts, which would apply to all transport related services. This can also evolve some kind of project justification method, through a social cost-benefit as infrastructure projects are normally not justifiable on financial rate of return, and until unless socio-economic benefits are taken into account we cannot justify any such projects. Here the representatives from all concerned sectors and other stakeholders who would collectively regulate and thereby reduce the potential for manipulation by any individual ministry (Narasimha Rao and Subhashish Gupta, 2005). Here the development should not be restricted only to the government sector. Rather private participation should also be welcomed along with ensuring proper follow of safety rules and consumer interest. Further there should be proper coordination in different branches, so that one branch is not at conflict with other branch and no part of the country is totally neglected. However, this should not result in restricting competition between different branches and it should be left to the market forces to decide the most economical and efficient means of transportation. The functional scope of such a regulator should be limited and well defined to include broad guidelines and standard processes, but need not include judicial powers.

Separate Regulator in Each Branch

Below this central regulator, there could be separate regulator in each branch viz. railways, roadways, airways, waterways including shipping and ports, and pipeline. The function of the central transport regulator would be to coordinate and develop an integrative policy for the development of transportation infrastructure, whereas the regulator of each sector would monitor the implementation of the above policy in consultation with the concerned sectors players.

Regulator in Indian Railways

Thus there should be one regulator with in the railways. Seeing the historical importance of the IR and its grand role being played in the nation building the regulator should be formed within the fold of the ‘Railway Board’, which would act independently and would advise to the ‘Railway Board’ on various issues. This separate regulatory body would remain at arms length from all service providers and stake holders including the government. Since government continues to be stakeholder it was natural that an independent and outside regulator, remaining equidistant from all service providers and stakeholders, including the government, to discharge this responsibility. This regulatory authority would be neither an administrative body nor a judicial one. Its function cannot be called administrative, as it is required to take consultative and transparent decisions, while, in practice, administrative decisions in India are generally opaque. Similarly it cannot be called a judicial body as the regulator is required to balance the interests of stakeholders during the regulatory processes and does not simply apply rules to facts as judicial bodies do (Sarkar and Srivastava in Sarkar and Kaushik ed. 2001: PP27- 44). Regulatory independence may mean that regulators should have: -

  • An arm length relationship with regulated firms, consumers and other interests.
  • An arm length relationship with political authorities
  • Organizational autonomy (Smith 1997)

Following major benefits are likely to accrue from a rational and even handed regulator

· Creation of right environment for the much-needed expansions of railways to take place with the induction of private capital.

· Better standards of railways services due to competition and greater managerial efficiency.

· Ensuring a fair rate of return on the railways investments and reasonable rates for the railways consumers.

· Technological upgradation and innovations like enabling high speed trains, heavy hauled goods trains etc.

· Greater consumer orientation – creating dynamic competitive markets, which deliver economic benefits to the consumers.

· Building consumers’ trust and confidence.

· Better transparency and fairness

· Establishing better avenues for communication between the regulated utility and stakeholders.

· An overall set up in the rate of economic growth.

Framework of Regulation

The above-proposed regulator must have functions relating to tariff control, ensuring quality of services and monitoring compliance, and authority to settle disputes. Broadly, policy making may be the exclusive area of the government/Railways whereas policy implementation may be left to the regulator. The core function of the regulator may include tariff regulation, checking quality of services and monitoring compliance, adjudication of disputes between operators, between licensor and operators, and between consumers and operators; consumer protection; and enforcement of licensing conditions. Since policy decision process in IR is centralized and all broad issues are decided on the Railway Board level, it is prudent to have the regulators office located in New Delhi itself. If any person or institution want to lodge a complain, this could be done personally, or through post or Internet. However, it should not become only another grievance cell, rather it would be looking only to the issue pertaining to the regulatory aspect. All other grievances should be directed to the IR.

The Task Ahead: The Role of IR

Once we have agreed for the formulation of regulator then we need to define the role of the IR and the regulator, so that there is no confusion for the respective roles. Since basically we would be forming the regulator for proper development of railways in India, the first responsibility starts from the IR side. IR need to spelt out in clear-cut term, what are the constraints and bottlenecks, which are hampering the proper functioning and growth of the railways. It will further assess whether those constraints and bottlenecks can be removed without any major fund requirement. If any policy change is required, it will be evaluated that whether those changes can be brought about, without creating any major upheaval. And if it is yes, then it will have to ensure that those changes are brought about within a reasonable period of the time. Say within 6 months, from the formal raising of the issue.

Then there are those issues where there are minor and major financial implications.

IR needs to identify these all issues, do thorough cost benefit analysis, and put the entire documents in public domain by putting them on internet and invite public participation in the debate. IR will further identify those projects where it is going to finance the entire projects on the internal resources on a time bond manner, say not more than five years and the stream of revenue is allotted in a fixed manner and should be non - lapsable in nature, so the even after the change of individual the project is implemented in a time bound manner.

Then there are those projects where fund will not be provided by the internal resources. Here, the IR would provide a part of fund, where another part would be invited by the private participation. Here also the entire project will be presented before the public, a through discussion will take place, and beyond the IR’s contribution which ever party comes with best solution and funding arrangement, would be entered with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with IR. Here again the Railways’ contribution would be definite and non-lapsable and so would be private party’s commitment. These kinds of project would be of two kinds: - first, those projects in which the implementation would be done by the IR itself and the public partner will get a fixed steam of revenue or a part of profit sharing out of the new project. Second would be those projects where the private participant would do the implementation and the IR’s contribution would be given for the project implementation. Once the project is completed, then the normal operation of the assets would start and the private participant will get the share of the revenue out of the running of the assets.

In last, there would be those projects where the IR will not invest any money, but would identify where any private agency can create an asset and can run as a part of IR operation and the profit generated out of the operation of those asset would be shared with the private participant. The private participant would be permitted to participate only when they have entered with a MOU with the IR in a pre-stated purpose with a proper financial stream and proper infrastructure to carry these activities. For the participation the IR would determine the specifications of the assets and it would be strictly followed so that there is seamless integration of the entire projects.

Some of the projects, which could be identified, would be as under: -

· Doubling of a railway line between some stations where there is serious capacity constraints.

· Improving the existing facility to improve the throughput say providing tokenless block instruments and colorlight signal so that more number of trains could run.

· Improving an existing an asset so that its utilization can improve, say provide mechanized loading unloading facility in a goods shed so that more number of freight train is handled in an existing goods shed.

· Providing more number of wagons.

· Providing more number of coaches

· Providing more number of electric locomotive

· Providing more number of diesels locomotive.

· Developing goods shed.

· Developing an ICD (Container terminal depot).

· Developing a passenger lounge in a busy station.

· Developing a new railway line.

· Running a coaching maintenance depot.

· Running a wagon maintenance depot.

· Maintenance of diesels locomotives.

· Maintenance of electric locomotives.

These activities can be done only when the cost assessment of these activities are done in more accurate and realistic manner. Further, we need to identify and define all these activities including cost in a clear cut unambiguous manner so that every body would understand same meaning. Hence, initially, there would be massive requirement of defining the specification and quantification. Thus some kind of contracting has been proposed by connecting public and private organizations for public service delivery. Here contracting would involve both institutional and even constitutional questions related to the state with a more focused questions on how to achieve best value for the public. The above contracting would involve a number of actors besides the main parties to the contract itself: the purchaser and the providers. These include the public that has to consume the services, the regulators who have to oversee the purchaser and the providers, the politicians and bureaucrats who lay out the contracting policy. The above suggestion would not be ‘for’ or against government rather for market. Today we will have to accept that purchaser of railways services are going to be smart buyers, so until unless quality services at the lowest price is not going to be offered they are not going to stick with us. The above-proposed public private partnership would facilitate a reflective stage where there is room for informed choices and balanced judgments (Greves, 2008). The role of regulator would be too see that every thing is being done as per agreement and no party is put into disadvantageous position due to any reason.

Relationship with the Railways

Relationship between railways and regulator may become a strong point of debate. It is being felt that the regulator should work as a part of railway system He should be directly reporting to the Chairman, Railway Board, The Government of India. Normally, the advice given by the regulator should be binding to the railways and should not be flouted easily. Only in case, if the Chairman along with the majority of the Railway Board Members feels that the advice or decision given by the regulator is in contravention with the national interest, then they can give overruling decisions. However, the detailed reasoned statement should always support such decisions with clear-cut para wise remarks against the regulator’s decision. Such decision should be immediately displayed in public domain including on the Internet. Giving such kind of power would lead to establishment of relatively unbiased system, which would lead to better faith on the system. This will lead to better return for the IR, as public participation in PPP projects would be more forth coming. Such decision of the Railway Board should be subject to review by the Supreme Court of India. Undoubtedly, it is being felt that a regulator should enjoy a certain degree of freedom to effectively discharge his duty under the proposed statute. The survival of the regulator should not be made dependent on the pleasure of the railways executive, and his autonomy has to be guaranteed by law. Of course, this independence cannot be absolute – it must be subjected to the law of the land and the policy of the government.

Doubt on Independence of Regulator in IR

There has always been some doubt that given the continued dominance of government in railways, whether regulators are really workable in India. Even though the enabling legislation empowers regulators with substantial scope and decision-making authority, several loopholes exist to undermine their authority. First, they are tied to government in their very structure. Second, they face capture in various forms. In addition to the well-recognized political interference for populist motives (e.g., lower passenger fare and no hike in it despite sharp increase in input cost), and ministries’ desire to protect and control the incumbent utilities adds a new dimension of capture possibilities. The government -owned utilities provide several benefits to bureaucrats, including pay-offs from large contracts and investments, as well as other favors. Regulators are often reluctant to penalize state-owned enterprises for non-compliance. Even when they do, their effectiveness is limited, since financial penalties mean little to state-owned utilities (Narasimha Rao and Subhashish Gupta, 2005). No doubt these pitfall exist, but once we know this then we can develop a framework where these risks are minimized in the beginning, and it is expected that once the private sector participation becomes prominent, they would also become assertive in safeguarding their interest. In fact, the regulator at that time has to act in such way that only one or two private players do not dominate it.

Safeguarding the Regulator

To ward off above doubt and to inculcate the confidence, the independence of the regulator may be tied up with appropriate measures of public accountability. According to Narasimha Rao and Subhashish Gupta the way forward is to encourage regulators to act in accordance with their mandate, and to remove the constraints that prevent them from implementing their mandate. This influences both regulators’ autonomy and enforceability of their actions. To the extent that collusive behavior is unavoidable, in the least measures must be taken to make such collusion difficult. Improving member selection, altering the scope for policy direction of regulators, and exposing private information about regulatory process and decisions by giving more transparency are some options for doing this. Narasimha Rao and Subhashish Gupta further suggest for three broad doctrines to meet these challenges- fiduciary trusteeship, consumer sovereignty and empowered citizenship. Fiduciary trusteeship treats oversight as a specialized function to be carried out by expert bodies – such as tribunals, legislative committees, and encourage strict procedure to limit regulatory discretion. In the consumer sovereignty, consumers exercise their sovereignty by exercising choice, which is facilitated by competition and rivalry, both among service providers and regulators. The third doctrine emphasizes the consumers’ role in scrutiny of regulatory process and service provision by reducing distance between the regulator (and service provider) and consumers, rather than just exercising choice.

Open and Transparent Regulatory Process

No doubt some tools like clear rules, an open and transparent regulatory process, and reasoned decisions may become powerful measures to ensure this. To maintain balance, the regulatory process may incorporate some crucial steps to ensure accountability. To ensure this stakeholder may be given the opportunity to present their views, the regulators decisions must be written and published, placed on public domain including on Internet along with the clear cut stated reasons for arriving on such decisions. The public comment should be invited and these should be considered before making the final rule. There may be proper provisions to appeal against the regulators decisions including in the court. These measures would ensure that all potential stakeholders are aware of the regulatory process and have an opportunity to present their views freely and frankly (Agarwal and Paul in Srivastava in Sarkar and Kaushik ed. 2001: PP3-15). This kind of transparency in decision-making would provide the integrity and credibility of the regulatory process. Making regulators accountable is another safeguarding as this will force more reasoned decision making, and dissuade regulators from yielding to informal lobbying.

Filing Annual Reports And Due Process Of Rulemaking

Filing annual reports is one mechanism of accountability. Such reports will give an overview about the activities what the regulator has done and the areas where no action has been initiated. Appeal process is another mechanism, which can be made against error, procedural, legal, and substantive grounds. Usually, affected parties to hold regulators accountable for inaction, if they can be shown to violate their mandate should utilize the appeals process. The due process of rulemaking with procedural checks and balances has to be rigorously pursued. To improve process accountability, procedural rules must incorporate obligatory requirements for transparency and explanation of rulemaking. These include maintenance and publishing of a rulemaking record, holding workshops, training programs and public hearings for important rules. These rules should be judicable, and their adherence subject to legislative scrutiny (along with annual reports and orders). Some amount of participation of public, particularly the stakeholders in rule making should be permitted. Information sharing and educating public about the market processes through user-friendly websites could be a helping tool for this purpose. To maintain a balance the regulator needs to ensure market players do not overcompensate and gain market power. Until such time that tariff setting is made free from the unpredictability of government intervention, as it is being done in railways, market risk mitigation through assured returns or price would need to continue. However, at the same time privatization design needs to build in better safeguards for cost discipline, and performance improvement so that each player or operator is self-dependent. For this, regulatory approval of capital expenditure and operating costs is essential. Second, the efficacy of such oversight will improve only with a reduction in information asymmetry, which goes back to the institutional efficacy issues and the fundamental need for a greater information flow in the regulatory process. In order to develop appropriate (quality) performance targets, regulators should consider the development and use of benchmarks. The key matrix’s for performance include loss reduction, customer satisfaction, quality of service and utility company’s financial performance, and only those companies would be able to survive which fit on these parameters. Reasonable standards, effective monitoring and enforceable penalties are the critical requirements to force utilities to improve quality of service. It may be noted that in competitive markets, public exposure of quality of service metrics for all competitors can significantly reduce information asymmetry, and increase pressures on competitors for quality. More detailed rules on quality of service need to be codified and enforced. Formal rules on adherence to standards would be judicable, thereby further strengthen accountability for quality of service. In this way a single body makes the implementation rules, administers them, and adjudicates disputes. It is expected to act in the public interest, actively engage virtually all sector stakeholders in decision-making, and effectively interpret and carry out a mandate that is based on a broad set of principles, while all along remaining unfettered by the influence of lobbyists. These all decisions would be pertaining for a politically sensitive sector like railways makes it more delicate. (Narasimha Rao and Subhashish Gupta, 2005).

Structure of the Regulator

To ensure the effectiveness of independent regulatory body – and therefore, the interest of the private participation- it is necessary that these bodies have the requisite expertise; independence and accountability and that there is an adequate level of coordination in the regulation of the sectors that have strong market inter linkages. Two critical issues that are of critical importance for credible regulatory framework are

· Staffing of the regulatory bodies, and

· Need for related multi-industry\ sector coordination

The main concerns in staffing issues relate to the background and expertise of the regulators, delays in feeling of the vacancies and getting the requisite supporting staff. An examination of the composition of the regulators presently in electricity, telecom sector, would show that most of them are either retired officers from government and government owned entities or retired judges. For example, in the case of electricity sector - which has highest number of regulators - nearly 60% are retired civil servants and judges and many of them are not only new to the sector, but also unwilling to take a pro-active approach to development. Considering the complexity of regulation in the sector and the need to function at ‘an arm’s length’ from the government, these situation causes a bit of concern. Wider talent and younger professionals with a good background on economic regulation / sector exposure are not getting appointed as regulators. This state of affair may be due to the composition of search committee, the selection process, terms and conditions of appointment, and the qualification and experience prescribed in the reform legislation (Leena Srivastava: 2005). The IR has to ensure that these common pitfalls are not forced on it and the matter is pursued in letter and spirit.

Objective Selection Process

To avoid this kind of situation recurring in the railways it should be clear that regulators should be selected through a broad based search committee, which should include some independent experts and representative from the private sector as well. There should be some degree of uniformity in the number and status of the members constituting the search committee. The post of the regulator should be widely publicized and advertised, clearly specifying their responsibility. There should be some form of mandatory induction training program for the entire regulators on various aspects of the railways, economic regulation etc. There should not be undue delays in filling up of the posts of regulators, which undermine the credibility regulatory institutions. The chairman of the regulatory commission should keep the following points while chairing a meeting

· The imperatives of economic regulation of railways requires conscious and proactive balancing interest in favor of overall sustained growth and development

· Decision making in regulatory commissions need to be undertaken in an open and participative manner.

Quality and Adequacy of the Supporting Staff

The quality and adequacy of the supporting staff also merit special emphasis. It is necessary that a well-trained core team of multi-disciplinary expert is available with a certain level of continuity. Based on the prevailing ground realities, innovative human resource development strategies, including intensive training programs, better perks and privileges etc need to be worked out to attract the better talent. (Leena Srivastava: 2005. PP: 1-3). To attract the better talent the pay scale of the staffs and officers should be at least one scale higher along with other perks and benefits.

Financial Independence

Financial independence is one of the sources of independence of any organization. Railways should ensure that the regulatory agencies should not be funded through a consolidated budget. Rather, they should recover costs through a consumer fee which could be collected from both passengers and goods transporters. They should finance internal capacity building and training through such a cess.

Relationship with the Regulated Entities

A regulator is supposed to ensure a level playing field for all players and a fair return on the investment made by them. He has to ensure their confidence to secure further investments and thus attain the goal of adequate competition to actually do away with the need for the regulator. Since the IR is a giant organization, and even if the private participation is started, for long, private operators would be too tiny to compete with the IR and IR may be in a position to deal unreasonably with the other players in the competitive market. Hence here the regulator has to ensure that the IR does not exploit this position and power. At the same time, it is extremely important that the regulator is not perceived to be bias in favor of, or against any particular entity. His ability to win the confidence of all the entities in the field would go long way in the success of the reform process.

The Consumers

In the present world, consumers are supposed to be king as we have gradually moved from the sellers’ market to the buyers’ market as these days a customer has plenty of opportunity to select one, which maximize his\her welfare maximum. This applies to the field of transportation as well. Therefore consumers have to be ensured of, by regulator, a fair price for the service and a commensurate quality of service. They cannot demand unreasonably low prices and should not be exploited into paying very high prices. This is where the abilities of the regulator to balance the interest of the consumers and those of the regulated utilities will be put to test. (Agarwal and Paul in Srivastava in Sarkar and Kaushik ed. 2001: PP3-15). From a consumer point of view, markets and regulators are complementary instruments as the role of the later is to compensate in some way for the failing of the former.

Theoretical Justification of Need of Regulator in Railways

In India, where market has failed to provide necessary impetus for the growth of the railways, there is complete justification to develop a regulator. The needs are two fold: -

· To correct the situation where market has failed.

· To address, the developmental aspects of the sector.

As we have seen that to meet the developmental needs of railways we have to take the benefit of private investments. Once different private operators are permitted to play different functions, then the primary role or purpose of regulation is to ensure that markets do not fail i.e. competition is not breaking down and is working properly. The goal of regulation is to devise proper arrangements best suited for this purpose. Policies are also required for enhancing development. Correspondingly, regulations are at time geared toward this end, especially when there is an urgent need to develop the railways.

At the initial stages of the development the railways services tend to act as public utilities. Consequently they are not profitable business and require subsidization. At the initial stages it is not feasible to promote the greater good of the development. Nevertheless, we have to accept that the subsidy or status quo cannot carry on perpetually and in the long run the railways need to be self-sufficient.

As we have seen, regulation can be either on the issue of price or on entry or over quality of service, alone, or any two of them or all three simultaneously. Each of the four reasons for market failure, which we have discussed earlier, needs to be analyzed and we need to identify the type of regulation, which would suit us in a best possible manner.

Since in the railways, the fixed cost associated with the setting up of operations is very high, this discourages most new entrants. Further the government controls the prices of different services and there is no guarantee for the timings and quality of services. This makes the entire working as non-standard and risky. Even if the railways rate may be low for many customers it has no meaning if there is no assured service. In view of availability of road transportation and its associated conveniences of door-to-door services many consumers are more interested in the reliability, continuity and safety of the services than only in the price they have to pay. So the regulator would be monitoring quality of services.

Regulation can consequently be administrative and economic. Administrative regulation means a watchdog body, which is set up to safeguard against monopoly abuses. It ensures that private operators are not put into undue disadvantages by the dominant player and all kinds of changes and rents are specified well in advance. Such regulator will have to promote demand and supply principle in freight sector from very beginning and gradually will have to extend in passenger segment as well.

Externality is another source of market failure. It appears when the benefit or cost of an exchange inside a market spill over onto other parties than those explicitly engaged in the exchange. Given an opportunity, the private sector would try to work only in those sectors where no long-term investment is required and where there is very high demand. To attract the fresh capital, where the lack of facility becomes the major bottleneck for the expansion of traffic, the IR may identify such routes and facilities to be developed, should duly notify in national and international press and on web and invite private capital investment and once the proper facilities have been developed than due profit sharing should be done. Since the initial fixed cost is very high, i.e. entry and exit is very costly, one cannot possibly have the margin of time by which the market determines the optimal number of private operators, and this role has to be taken over by the government. They need to put an entry restriction. Entry should be regulated in accordance with traffic projections; market development, capacity requirement and the existing facility available as over capacity can lead to the sickness of the private operators.

The externality problem also arises in the developmental stages. In order to provide linkages and faster development of an area IR have to cater to economically unviable regions and routes. In such undeveloped or underdeveloped regions it becomes un-remunerative to run both passenger and freight services. Here the role of regulator could be to ensure that there should be some mechanism through which the region that benefits from the railways services provides the compensation to the operators. In other words, there must be some mechanism of incentive that must be designed into the system.

Severe informational asymmetries, the fourth reason for market failure, might have potential effects for the railways. The issues pertaining to safety and environmental standards are very critical, particularly in ecologically fragile zones like coastal regions, mountainous regions etc. Hence the role of the regulator in ensuring safety and environmental standard as well as proper flow of information would be very crucial. (Hazra 2000: PP 1-7)

Since the IR is a major stakeholder in the development of an efficient infrastructure in the country and has the financial and technical capabilities to demand effective regulatory institutions, it needs to play an important role in determining the policy and formation of regulation and regulator. It would also serve the long term interest to invest in capacity building of regulatory commissions and their staff, so as to ensure well reasoned and forward looking regulations that would find a perfect balance between all stakeholders.

We may conclude that, if we adopt the above suggestion, then the IR will get the necessary blood to revitalize and rejuvenate itself and potentially morbid organization would again adopt a path of youth ness. Without this the IR is already rapidly missing its market share. Once these strategies are adopted then the trend will be arrested immediately and gradually it will again improve its pie in the share. The private participation and expertise would also bring more efficiency, accountability and necessary capital, which have been missing or were less all through. Allocative efficiency would be gained from these reforms and there would be substantial reduction in dead weight loss. More efficient allocation of investment will result in less political interference in investment decisions. This will also lead to reducing in cross subsidization among different products and customer groups. (Philippa Dee and Duc Nguyen-Hong: Domestic Regulatory Reform and Liberalization of Trade in Infrastructure Services in Sidorenko ed. 2003). It is expected that suggested reform will result in greater market access. The implementation of these changes or reform will not come at the expanses of social welfare or equity considerations, or other national objectives. These reforms will allow a more efficient allocation of resources and facilitate structural changes. Different prices of railway services would become more reflective of costs, and improved productivity and lower prices will reduce the input and production costs of user industries or the service provider. Lower prices and grater product choices will ultimately benefit to the customer as well.

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Useful Sites: -

http://indiarail.info/component/option,com_frontpage/

http://www.indianrailways.gov.in